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Abstract 
This research paper examines the corporate dividend payout behaviors of non-financial firms from 
Istanbul Stock Exchange (Borsa Istanbul). Survey method is conducted to investigate managerial views on 
corporate dividend policy. The study investigates whether the evidence in Turkish stock market on dividend 
policy is similar to the European and the U.S. firms’ results which are reported earlier by other studies, 
and moreover in what extent Lintner’s (1956) findings on dividends is supported by today’s listed firms in 
an emerging market. The financial managers from 38 firms out of 216 non-financial companies responded 
the survey. The results show that there is a significant positive relationship between cash dividends and 
earnings. Earnings are viewed as the most important factor in dividend decision like in European and the 
U.S. firms. Sustainable change in earnings, stability and level of future earnings, and the desire to 
distribute a proportion of earnings to shareholders are the common determinants of dividend policy. The 
majority of the respondents reports that they target dividends. Dividend yield is the most common measure 
for dividend targeting. Share repurchases are not viewed as alternative to dividend payouts unlike the U.S. 
firms. The study finds supporting evidences for bird-in-the-hand and signaling hypotheses, and Lintner’s 
model. 
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Introduction 
Dividends and dividend policy have been among the 
key research areas in finance theory. Starting from the 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1961) irrelevance theorem, 
dividends have been a controversial issue. The effect of 
dividends on firm value became a core topic around 
dividends with Modigliani and Miller’s (MM) model. 
The assumptions of irrelevance model inspired the other 
models which seek to explain dividends, such as tax-
effect hypothesis (Brennan, 1970), clientele effects 
(Elton and Gruber, 1970; Miller and Scholes, 1978), 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), signalling 
hypothesis (Ross, 1977; Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and 
Rock, 1985), and behavioural explanations (Shefrin and 
Statman, 1984; Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). 
Recently, researches on dividends have been focused on 
corporate payout behaviours more than the relevancy of 
dividends and the effects of market imperfections on 
dividends for a couple of decades.  Fama and French 
(2001), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004), 
Baker and Wurgler (2004) investigated whether 
dividends disappeared, reappeared or concentrated and 
Narman Kuzucu /International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science  
Vol 4, No 2, 2015 ISSN: 2147-4478 
Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders. 
 
Pa
ge
2	
how the firm specific characters affect dividend 
behaviours. Baker, Farrelly and Edelman (1985), Baker 
and Powell (1999, 2000), Da Silva, Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004), Brav, Graham, Harvey and 
Michaely (2005), Bancel, Bhattacharyya and Mittoo 
(2005), and Denis and Osobov (2008) examined the 
determinants of dividend payout policy, particularly 
using surveys on managerial perspectives. Those 
researches emphasized on the cross-country, legal 
system and other specific characteristics of firms on 
dividend decisions. Empirical evidence is obtained from 
managerial perspective in most of those researches. 
Dong, Robinson and Veld (2005), Grinstein and 
Michaely (2005), and Graham and Kumar (2006) 
focused on investors’ preferences on dividends. They 
examined the effect of clienteles, retail versus 
institutional investors. All of those researches try to 
explain the motives and the reasons underlying dividend 
decisions. Focusing on why and how firms pay out 
dividends has been a research approach in dividends 
literature to explain the payout behaviours. 
The objective of this study is to examine corporate 
dividend policies of firms and the factors which 
influence dividends, focusing on Turkish listed firms. 
The study investigates that how the corporate managers 
make dividend decisions and what are the approaches 
and the opinions of managers towards dividends. 
Literature Review  
In a recent survey (Baker, Singleton and Veit, 2011) in 
which the finance academics were questioned with 144 
valid responses, dividend policy was ranked in the sixth 
out of twenty corporate finance subjects that would 
most benefit from future survey research.1 The survey 
reports that finance academics believe in that survey 
research in finance produces data unavailable from 
other sources, and helps bridge the gap between the 
theory and practice. 
Survey technique on dividend policy was initiated with 
the pioneering work in this field literally. Lintner (1956) 
who founded the modern understanding of dividend 
policy conducted surveys and detailed interviews with 
the managers of 28 listed companies on NYSE.  
Baker, Farrelly, and Edelman (1985) surveyed CFOs of 
318 NYSE-listed firms (in a sample of 562 selected 
firms), asking which factors they consider most 
important in determining their firm’s dividend policy. 
                                                             
1 The highest rankings are corporate governance, capital 
budgeting, risk measurement and management, behavioral 
finance and capital structure, respectively. 
Their main purpose was to compare their evidence with 
Lintner’s findings 30 years earlier. Furthermore, one of 
their purposes was to determine the effect of industry on 
managers’ views about the determinants of dividend 
policy. The industry groups were utility, manufacturing, 
and wholesale/retail. The results showed that the most 
ranked determinants were the anticipated level of future 
earnings and the pattern of past dividends, and the 
availability of cash holdings, respectively. The first two 
factors were consistent with Lintner’s findings. In the 
second part of the survey, the financial managers were 
asked whether they agreed in some statements about 
dividend policy.  The results also supported Lintner’s 
findings as the two statements were among highest 
ranked statements that a firm should avoid making 
changes in its dividend rates that might soon have to be 
reversed, and should try  to maintain a stable track 
record of dividend payments. Moreover, managers 
agreed in that they targeted dividend payouts. Dividend 
patterns of regulated industries such as utilities are 
different than the others. Baker et al. (1985) reported 
that utilities industry had apparently higher payout 
ratios than the other ones. Regulations may be a 
significant factor on dividends. Thus, they propose that 
highly regulated industries should be separately 
examined from competitive industries. 
Pruitt and Gitman (1991) surveyed 1,000 largest US 
firms’ managers about investment, financing and 
dividend policies. Their results suggest that dividends 
are closely related to earnings. The main determinants 
are current and past years’ earnings, variability of 
earnings and growth in earnings. Their results are 
consistent with Lintner’s findings, and the survey results 
of Baker et al. (1985). 
Baker and Powell (2000) examined the views of 
financial managers about the determinants of dividend 
policy with a similar questionnaire 15 years later than 
Baker et al. (1985). Their work had 258 respondents out 
of a sample set including 603 NYSE-listed firms. The 
results are nearly the same with a more limited scope. 
They reported that little change occurred in the views of 
managers on dividend policy after 15 years. The most 
ranked factors were the level of current and expected 
future earnings, and pattern of past dividends. 
Baker, Powell, and Veit (2002) surveyed the financial 
managers NASDAQ firms. They included the financial 
sectors firms unlike the similar works, and compared 
the dividend patterns of those to non-financial firms. 
They examined the managers’ views, analyzing the data 
of 188 respondents out of 630 sample firms.  The 
highest ranked factors were the pattern of past 
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dividends, the stability of earnings, and the level of 
current and expected future earnings, respectively. 
These results are consistent with earlier survey studies 
of NYSE-listed firms. They compared the results of 
financial firms’ managers to non-financial counterparts, 
and found significant differences between the overall 
rankings of two clusters. Accordingly, respondents from 
financial firms view the most ranked factors more 
important than their non-financial counterparts. 
Concerns about target capital structure and financial 
leverage are of more importance from the perspective of 
financial firms’ managers. Moreover, “legal rules and 
constraints” were rated more significantly as a more 
important factor for financial firms. Financial firms and 
banks must meet some specific capital adequacy 
requirements. Thus, regulated sectors such as banks are 
more concerned with the legal rules and constraints. 
Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely2 “BGHM” (2005) 
conducted a survey on 384 financial managers and 
additionally interviews with 23 managers to determine 
the dividend and share repurchase policies of both 
public and private (mostly public) non-financial firms in 
the US. They found that Lintner’s key findings are still 
valid for corporate payout decisions. Firms smooth 
dividends from year to year as Lintner proposed. Firms 
are reluctant to cut dividends since market reacts to 
dividend decreases. On the other hand, firms are 
reluctant to initiate or increase dividends because of 
concerns about earnings’ stability in the future. Their 
results diverge in dividend targeting of Lintner’s model.  
They propose that firms target the dividend payout ratio 
less than they used to in the past. Large share 
repurchases replaced the dividends and managers favor 
the flexibility of share repurchases. Their results 
indicate that managers think that operational and 
investment decisions are more important than financing 
decisions. This is clearly consistent with MM’s 
irrelevance theory. Surveyed managers’ views do not 
support clientele explanations whereas they provide 
evidence for that tax is one of the dominant factors of 
dividend payouts.  
Bancel, Bhattacharyya and Mittoo “BBM” (2005) 
surveyed managers from 16 European countries to 
examine cross-country determinants of payout policy.3 
                                                             
2 The surveys of Brav et al. (2005) and Bancel et al. (2005) are 
used as benchmarks for this study. Therefore, the initials of 
the authors, BGHM and BBM are used as acronyms in the 
paper for simplicity. 
3 The surveyed firms are of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom. 
Additionally, one of their research purposes was to 
collect managerial data about European repurchases and 
to compare with the US counterparts, noting that 
repurchases were prohibited in certain European 
countries up until lately and most firms also continued 
to pay regular dividends beside repurchase unlike the 
US.  
They find that managerial views of European firms on 
the factors which influence dividend decisions are 
largely similar to the US peers. Lintner’s findings are 
supported also by European mangers’ views. Moreover, 
European managers’ views on the determinants of share 
repurchases are similar to their peers in the US. 
European countries have different legal systems; 
mainly, Civil law, Common law and Scandinavian law. 
Cross-country results of managerial views on dividends 
do not show a systematic relation between quality of 
legal systems and dividend policies. Thus, the results of 
BBM do not support La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (2000) who proposed a positive 
relation between legal protection of investors and 
dividend policies.  
Dong, Robinson, and Veld (2005) conducted a survey 
on individual investors to investigate why investors 
want dividends. They asked questions about personal 
finance and consumption patterns to more than 2,000 
individual investors in the Netherlands. The 
questionnaire was designed to test the evidence for 
various theories and explanations of dividend policy. 
The results obtained through investors’ responses to the 
questions regarding the consumption and cash dividends 
do not support behavioural explanations. However the 
responses on stock dividends are consistent with 
behavioural explanations.  
Baker, Dutta and Saadi (2008) surveyed Canadian listed 
firms at Toronto Stock Exchange. They examined the 
views of both financial and non-financial firms’ 
managers. They investigated the effect of financial and 
multinational operations on dividends from managerial 
perspective. The most rated factors are the stability of 
earnings, the pattern of past dividends, the level of 
current earnings, and the level of expected future 
earnings, respectively. They result that financial and 
non-financial firms differs in many aspects. Non-
financial firms’ managers agree more with the view that 
dividends generally follow a smoother path than 
earnings whereas managers of financial firms agree in 
that a firm must set a target dividend payout ratio more 
significantly. Baker et al. (2008) compare their results to 
the surveys by BGHM and by BBM, and result that the 
most important determinants of dividends perceived by 
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Canadian firms’ managers are similar to those of US 
and European firms. 
Researchers used similar questionnaires to survey 
corporate managers in different countries including 
European, Middle East, Japan and South Asia countries. 
This study is one of the first researches (maybe the first) 
which focus on the managerial perspective of Turkish 
listed firms as far as we know.  
Research and Methodology 
A survey research was conducted to obtain the opinions 
of financial managers on dividend policies of Turkish 
listed companies. Questionnaire based studies in 
corporate finance focus particularly on developed 
markets such as American and European countries. 
Emerging markets are rarely the target of survey 
researches on corporate finance. The target of this study 
is the listed companies in Turkish stock market (Borsa 
Istanbul or BIST). The objective of the research is 
determining the factors influencing the dividends and 
the dividend decisions of Turkish listed firms by 
examining the finance executives’ opinions on 
dividends. In the end, the findings are compared to 
previous works done for the European and US firms. 
Survey Design and Hypotheses 
The survey questionnaire includes several questions on 
dividends and share repurchases that have been used in 
the studies of BGHM (2005) and BBM (2005).  Those 
questionnaires were adapted to Turkey conditions, 
particularly considering the tax and share repurchase 
regulations differences. Similar questionnaires were 
used to investigate the managerial views in various 
countries by different researchers. This provides a base 
for comparative analysis of cross-country dividend 
policies. 
Survey method has some limitations. Surveys measure 
perceptions and the views of the respondents. Those 
may differ from the actual corporate actions. Actually, 
this is not a problem for the study because the goal is 
indeed to investigate managerial perspective. 
Surveys may suffer from non-respondent bias. 
Nonresponse bias usually cannot be avoided and thus, 
inevitably creates statistical measurement errors at most 
survey researches. In order to minimize nonresponse, 
confidential / private questions which corporate 
managers may hesitate to respond or answer correctly 
were not included in the questionnaire during the design 
of the survey. Furthermore, representativeness of the 
data of respondents was tested to detect nonresponse 
bias. 
In order to determine possibility of non-response bias, 
the responding firms were compared to non-responding 
firms. Some firm characteristics of the 38 respondent 
firms were compared to the sample set including both 
respondents and non-respondents. Table 1 exhibits the 
summary statistics of respondents and the sample set. 
No significant differences exist between the respondent 
and non-respondent firms on the compared 
characteristics. The test results show that the sample set 
of respondent firms is quite representative to the whole 
sample set. Thus, non-response bias does not appear to 
be a considerable problem in the survey.  
The questionnaire has mainly two sections. In the first 
section, six closed-end questions are available. The first 
question in which sixteen factors exist is related to the 
determinants influencing dividend decision. The second 
question has eighteen statements. The respondents are 
asked to answer how the factors / statements regarding 
the dividend payouts suit their company’s dividend 
policies. Five-point scaling which measures (-2) as 
unimportant / strongly disagree to (2) as very important 
/ strongly agree is used. The third question is about 
dividend targeting with multiple choices. The remaining 
three questions are about the managers’ opinions 
regarding share repurchase which is a new practice for 
Turkish companies brought by the new commercial 
code. In the second section of the questionnaire, the 
managers were asked about the profiles of their firms 
like size, industry and ownership structures in order to 
provide data for cross-sectional analysis. The survey 
was designed as a web-based survey and submitted to 
the corporate executives as a link to the survey. The 
questionnaire takes totally 10 - 15 minutes to complete. 
The survey hypothesizes that the stability and level of 
future earnings, and sustainable change in earnings are 
the major determinants of dividends as they are such in 
the European and the US corporate managers’ opinions. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis of the survey is the views 
of Turkish and European firms’ managers on dividend 
payout policy are influenced by similar factors. The 
results of the survey will enable us to view the 
similarities and dissimilarities of the motives behind 
dividend policy of listed firms on BIST compared to 
European peers. Thus, following hypotheses are 
examined: 
Hଵୟ	: The factors influencing dividends of Turkish 
listed firms are similar to European firms based on their 
financial managers’ views. 
Hଵୠ	:  The views of Turkish and European financial 
managers are similar on their firms’ dividend policy. 
Narman Kuzucu /International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science  
Vol 4, No 2, 2015 ISSN: 2147-4478 
Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders. 
 
Pa
ge
5	
Share repurchase is a new tool for firms in Turkish 
stock market. Another objective of the survey research 
is to learn what drives share repurchase decision of a 
firm in place of dividend payout, and how the financial 
managers view the new tool. The prior studies show that 
share repurchases are considered as substitutes for 
dividends by the US firms whereas majority of 
European firms considers as a tool for flexibility rather 
than substitutes for dividends (BGHM, 2005: BBM, 
2005).  
In European managers’ perspective, the major factor 
influencing share repurchase decision is stock price 
(BBM, 2005). The undervaluation of the share price of 
the firm will trigger share repurchase decision rather 
than a dividend payment. Therefore, the second 
hypothesis of the survey is as follows: 
Hଶ	:  Turkish and European managers’ views on 
share repurchase decision are influenced by similar 
factors. 
Sample Set 
The number of listed firms was 240 on BIST, excluding 
the financial sector companies as of year 2012 when the 
survey was conducted. Financial firms such as banks, 
insurance companies, holdings, leasing and factoring 
companies are excluded from the scope because their 
financing sources and capital structures are very 
different from the non-financial firms. Thus, the number 
of companies in the sample set which were invited to 
participate in the survey was finally, 216, taking into 
account those treasury operations and shareholder / 
investor relations of some groups of companies were 
shared. 
The invitation e-mails including the survey’s web 
address was sent to the CFOs on February 2012. Some 
required measures were taken to avoid duplication in 
responses. The firms which did not fill out the 
questionnaire were reminded one month later and once 
again on May 2012. The questionnaire was submitted to 
the remaining firms once again by facsimile or an 
attached spreadsheet file in an e-mail to the managers 
who asked at last on October 2012 in order to increase 
the response rate. Finally, 38 valid responses were 
obtained from BIST-listed companies with a response 
rate of 17.6%. It is a relatively favorable result when 
response rates of similar surveys have been considered. 
For instance, the survey which was conducted by BBM 
for European firms had a response rate of 8.2%.  BGHM 
obtained 16% response rate in their survey for the US 
firms whereas the response rate was 35.4% in a survey 
for Canadian listed firms by Baker et al (2008). The 
answerers were mostly CFOs, then treasurers, finance 
and accounting managers and rarely investor relation 
managers of the associated firms, respectively. 
Table 1 exhibits the characteristics of respondent firms 
in comparison with the sample set. Initially, sample set 
and respondents are grouped as dividend payers and 
non-payers. A firm which has paid out at least once for 
the last three years is assumed to be a payer. 
Subsequently, the firms are classified in terms of size, 
industry, ownership and floating rate. The sales revenue 
in the year 2011 was taken into account.  
23.7% of respondent firms have smaller sales revenue 
than 100 million TL. The sales of 44.7% of the 
respondent firms are between 100 million TL and 1 
billion TL. 31.6% of the respondents are large size firms 
with sales greater than 1 billion TL. Firms are divided 
into manufacturing and non-manufacturing groups by 
industry. Accordingly, 63.2% of respondent firms are 
manufacturing, and 36.8% of them are non-
manufacturing whereas 71.3% of the firms in the 
sample set are manufacturing, and 28.7% of the sample 
set is non-manufacturing firms. Turkish listed firms are 
generally family or individual controlled firms. In the 
sample set, 62.5% of the firms are family controlled. 
Similarly, 63.2% of the respondents are family 
controlled firms whereas the remaining 36.8% is widely 
held. The distribution of respondent firms by size, 
industry and ownership is quiet similar to the 
distribution of the firms in the sample set.  
The firms are grouped by floating rate as less than 20%, 
between 20% and 39%, and greater than 40%. 
Accordingly, the breakdown of respondents into these 
groups is 28.9%, 52.6%, and 18.4% respectively. The 
breakdown of the firms in the sample set is not much 
different; 33.3%, 41.2%, and 25.5%, respectively. 
45.4% of the firms in the sample set have paid out 
dividends at least once in the last three years. The firms 
which hold this criterion are supposed to be a dividend 
payer. The remaining portion of 54.6% is not payer, 
accordingly. 60.5% of the respondents are dividend 
payer. That shows dividend payer firms are more likely 
to participate in the survey. The executives of payer 
firms are more interested in a survey research on 
dividends. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Sample Set and the Respondents 
Comparison by Size 
# of Sample 
Firms 
% of Sample 
Firms 
# of Respondent 
Firms 
% of Respondent 
Firms 
Small (Sales less than 100 m 
TL) 70 32.4% 9 23.7% 
Medium (Sales between 100 m 
TL - 1bn TL) 106 49.1% 17 44.7% 
Large (Sales greater than 1bn 
TL) 40 18.5% 12 31.6% 
TOTAL 216 100.0% 38 100.0% 
Comparison by Industry 
Manufacturing 154 71.3% 24 63.2% 
Non-manufacturing (service / 
trade) 62 28.7% 14 36.8% 
TOTAL 216 100.0% 38 100.0% 
Comparison by Ownership 
Family (or individual) 
controlled 135 62.5% 24 63.2% 
Widely held 81 37.5% 14 36.8% 
TOTAL 216 100.0% 38 100.0% 
Comparison by Floating Rate  
Less than %20 72 33.3% 11 28.9% 
Between %20 and %39 89 41.2% 20 52.6% 
Greater than %40 55 25.5% 7 18.4% 
TOTAL 216 100.0% 38 100.0% 
Comparison by Payouts 
Payer 98 45.4% 22 57.9% 
Non-payer 118 54.6% 17 42.1% 
TOTAL 216 100.0% 38 100.0% 
Source: Author 
 
Results and Discussions 
Table 2 exhibits the Spearman’s ranking correlation 
coefficients between the firm specific variables of 
respondent firms. Spearman’s correlation coefficients 
measure the correlation of the corporate variables used 
in the survey analysis. The coefficients are quit low. 
These results show that there is no evidence of 
multicollinearity between the firm-level variables in 
the cross-sectional regression analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The correlation coefficients of dividend variable with 
various variables exhibit noteworthy results. Dividend 
variable’s (DIV) correlation coefficients with size, 
leverage are statistically significant at the 5% level, 
and with EPS at the 1% level. The sign of correlation 
coefficients with EPS (.703) and Size (.341) are 
positive whereas the one with D/A (.331) is negative. 
Accordingly, dividend payouts are positively 
correlated to earnings and size; and negatively 
correlated to leverage.  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Sample Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficients 
VARIABLES Size Ind Exp For Flo Own DIV D/A P/B P/E EPS 
Size 1.0 
          
Sig. (2-tailed) 
           
Ind .266 1.0 
         
Sig. (2-tailed) .107 
          
Exp -.015 .485** 1.0 
        
Sig. (2-tailed) .930 .002 
         
For -.238 .200 .109 1.0 
       
Sig. (2-tailed) .150 .229 .515 
        
Flo -.093 -.036 .197 .116 1.0 
      
Sig. (2-tailed) .578 .832 .236 .488 
       
Own .072 .178 .008 .179 -.241 1.0 
     
Sig. (2-tailed) .668 .284 .963 .283 .145 
      
Div .341* .053 -.209 -.245 -.035 -.204 1.0 
    
Sig. (2-tailed) .036 .753 .207 .138 .834 .219 
     
D/A .314 -.040 .096 -.152 .165 .005 -.331* 1.0 
   
Sig. (2-tailed) .055 .812 .568 .363 .321 .977 .042 
    
P/B .266 -.159 -.240 -.331* -.026 -.193 .304 .268 1.0 
  
Sig. (2-tailed) .117 .354 .159 .048 .881 .260 .072 .114 
   
P/E -.103 -.122 -.008 .054 -.077 .100 .129 .169 .352 1.0 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .600 .536 .969 .785 .697 .614 .512 .390 .072 
  
EPS .437** .146 -.001 -.329* .137 -.049 .703** -.178 .425** .090 1.0 
Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .382 .994 .044 .412 .772 .000 .284 .010 .651 
 
Cross tabulations are conducted by surveyed firms' characteristics. These are Size, where large firms are defined as those companies with reported sales exceeding 1 billion TL; 
Industry (Ind), where the firm is manufacturing or non-manufacturing; foreign sales (Exp), where a firm's foreign sales exceeds 25% of total sales; foreign shares (For), where the foreign 
shareholders own more than 20% of total common stocks; floating rate (Flo), where the shares exceeding 20% of the shares of the company  are traded at the Stock Exchange; ownership (Own), 
denoting whether the firm is family controlled or not; payout ratio (DIV), denoting whether the firm has paid dividend at least once in the last 3 years or not ;  leverage (D/A), where a high 
debt/total assets ratio is defined as exceeding 0.50; price-to-book ratio (P/B), where the price-to-book ratio is greater than 2; P/E, where the price-to-earnings ratio is greater than 14; EPS, where 
a profitable firm is defined having EPS>0. The variables are ranked from low to high. The values at first rows for each variable denote correlation coefficients while the second rows show p-
values. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Narman Kuzucu /International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science  
Vol 4, No 2, 2015 ISSN: 2147-4478 
Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders. 
 
Pa
ge
8	
Corporate financial managers are asked several 
questions to explore what factors influence the 
companies’ dividend policies and how the companies’ 
payout policies and practices are in the view of 
financial executives.  
Table 3 shows the results of responses for each of the 
factors influencing the respondent firms’ dividend 
policy. The factors are ranked by the average rating in 
the table. Column 2 reports the percentage of 
respondents considering a factor as important or very 
important. Column 3 provides the mean rating. 
Column 4 shows whether the mean rating is 
significantly different from zero on the basis of a t-
test. For comparison, columns from 5 to 8 provide the 
views of CFOs from Europe and the USA on the 
related factors from the surveys of BBM (2005) and 
BGHM (2005). 
The results of T-statistic tests indicate that all the 
factors are significant in dividend decision except 
three factors. These three insignificant factors are; 
need to keep minority shareholders happy, attracting 
institutional investors, and the market price of firm’s 
stock. The influence of institutional shareholders is 
significant at the 10% level. Reducing cash disciplines 
firms to make efficient decisions is significant at the 
5% level. The other ten factors are significant at the 
1% level.  
Cross-sectional regression tests were made to examine 
the strength of the relation between the rankings of 
factors of dividends by firm specific factors. The five-
point scales are collapsed into three categories; 
strongly disagree and disagree (-2 and -1), neither 
agree nor disagree (0), and agree and strongly agree 
(+1 and +2) in order to perform these tests and to 
compare the results with the results of prior surveys 
for Europe and the U.S. 
4.1 The Factors Influencing Dividend Decisions 
Table 3 presents the responses of financial managers 
in regards with the factors influencing dividend payout 
decisions. The most important factors according to the 
ranking by average ratings are; desire to pay out a 
given fraction of earnings in the long run (F34; mean 
rating: 1.13), a sustainable change in earnings (F1; 
1.05), and current degree of financial leverage (F6; 
1.05), respectively. The fourth factor is (F2) stability 
and level of future earnings with the mean rating of 
1.03. The other factors are of less importance 
                                                             
4 The factors and the statements are numbered according to 
the displaying order on the questionnaire, and abbreviated 
and denoted such as F1 and S1.  
relatively with average ratings decreasing from 0.70 to 
-0.87. 
The ranking of the factors is slightly different when 
the percentages of responses of important and very 
important (+1 and +2) are considered in place of the 
mean rating. A great majority of respondents think 
(84% for each) that a sustainable change in earnings 
(F1), stability and level of future earnings (F2) are the 
most important factors in dividend decisions. Desire to 
pay out a given fraction of earnings in the long run 
(F3) is the third factor. 82% of the respondents view 
that desire to pay out a given fraction of earnings in 
the long run is important in dividend decision. These 
results strongly agree with the Lintner Model which 
suggests dividends are related to company earnings, 
and firms have a long-run desired payout ratio 
between dividends and earnings (Lintner, 1956). 
Moreover, these results are very similar to the ones of 
European survey by BBM in 2005. The ranking of the 
first three factors are the same with the opinions of 
CFOs from European firms.  
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Table 3: Responses to the Factors Influencing Dividend Payout Decisions 
 Turkey Europe US 
How important are the following factors to your company’s decision to pay dividends? 
Imp. 
or 
Very 
Imp. 
(%) 
n=38      
Mean 
H0: Average 
Rating=0 
Imp. 
or 
Very 
Imp.   
(%) 
n=93     
Mean 
Imp. 
or 
Very 
Imp.  
(%) 
n=256     
Mean 
Desire to pay out a given fraction of earnings in the long run (F3) 81.58 1.13 *** 68.48 0.85 n/a n/a 
A sustainable change in earnings (F1)  84.21 1.05 *** 77.78 1.08 67.10 0.80 
Current degree of financial leverage (F6)  78.95 1.05 *** 51.09 0.53 n/a n/a 
Stability and level of future earnings (F2)  84.21 1.03 *** 89.01 1.36 71.90 0.90 
Maintaining consistency with our historic dividend policy (F16) 70.27 0.70 *** 67.39 0.83 84.10 1.20 
The availability of good investment opportunities for our firm to pursue (F11) 60.53 0.50 *** 59.78 0.71 47.60 0.20 
Having extra cash/liquid assets relative to our desired cash holdings (F5) 52.63 0.45 ** 28.09 0.19 30.30 -0.20 
The influence of our institutional shareholders (F8)  52.63 0.34 * 58.06 0.56 52.40 0.40 
Need to keep minority shareholders happy (F10) 39.47 0.21 
 
29.35 0.08 n/a n/a 
Attracting institutional investors because they monitor management decisions (F9) 39.47 -0.05 
 
50.54 0.49 33.10 -0.10 
Market price of our stock (if our stock is a good investment relative to its true value (F4) 28.95 -0.11 
 
36.26 0.24 34.80 0.00 
Paying out to reduce cash, disciplining our firm to make efficient decisions (F14) 23.68 -0.42 ** 21.74 -0.05 13.20 -0.90 
The dividend policies of competitors or other companies in our industry (F13) 15.79 -0.63 *** 34.41 0.14 38.30 -0.20 
To pay dividends indicates to investors that we are running low on profitable investments (F12) 15.79 -0.79 *** 13.33 -0.18 17.80 -0.60 
Contractual constraints such as dividend restrictions in debt contracts (F15) 23.68 -0.82 *** 7.87 -0.16 42.30 -0.26 
Personal taxes our stockholders pay when receiving dividends (F7) 10.53 -0.87 *** 20.65 -0.08 21.10 -0.50 
 
Column 1 lists each of the 16 factors rated by the respondents. Column 2 shows the percentage of responses of important (+1) and very important (+2). Column 3 shows the 
mean rating of each factor. Column 4 provides the result of the t-statistic for the null hypothesis that the mean response equals 0 (no importance). Columns 5 and 6 present the 
results from BBM (2005) survey, columns 7 and 8 present the results from BGHM (2005) survey. ***, ** and * denote a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
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A majority of respondents (79%) consider current 
degree of financial leverage as one of the most 
important factors in dividend decision. 70% of the 
respondents view that maintaining consistency with 
their historic dividend policy (F16) as an important 
factor. The mean rating of this factor is 0.70. That 
result is a supportive evidence for payout policy 
conservatism as Lintner (1956) suggested. But the 
evidence from the opinions of CFOs of Turkish listed 
firms is not as strong as the US evidence. 85% of 
respondents from the US firms agreed in that 
maintaining consistency with their historic dividend 
policy is important whereas 67% of European 
managers agreed in that. 
The influence of institutional investors is somewhat 
important but not distinctive. 53% of the respondents 
agree that influence of institutional investors is 
important. The result is similar to European and the 
US firms. The mean rating of the managers of Turkish 
firms (0.34) is quiet lower than European and the US 
counterparts. 
Personal tax status of shareholders is a very poor 
factor. Only 11% of respondents agree that tax status 
of shareholders is important when paying out 
dividends with a mean rating of -0.87. The result 
implies that a great majority of the financial 
executives do not consider the tax status of the 
shareholders during payouts. 
4.2 Dividend Patterns of Turkish Firms versus 
European and the US Peers 
Table 4 shows survey responses about some dividend 
policy related statements ranked by the mean rating. 
The most agreed statement is that an optimal dividend 
policy strikes a balance between current dividends and 
future growth that maximizes stock price (S7). 84% of 
financial managers agree in this view with a mean 
rating of 0.97. That is one of the most agreed 
statements by the managers from European firms. 
Interestingly, 78% of the financial managers agree in 
the view that the dividend changes will have an impact 
on executive compensation (S10). Only 1% of the 
managers from European firms agree in this view 
whereas this is not applicable for the US survey. The 
mean rating is 0.84. The reason behind this different 
result must be related to the corporate governance of 
Turkish firms because most of the Turkish listed firms 
are managed by insider ownership. The shareholders 
who hold control power and majority of shares are 
often at the top management in Turkish firms. 
Separation of management and ownership is not 
distinct to the extent of European firms.  
82% of the respondents believe in that dividend 
decisions convey information to investors (S4) with a 
0.80 mean rating. The result is very similar to the 
evidence from the US managers. 80% of managers 
from the US firms agree in this view. This statement is 
not applicable in Europe survey. The result is 
consistent with signalling hypothesis. The managers 
believe in signalling effect of dividends. Yet, this is 
not an evidence of that they use dividends as 
signalling tools like most of signalling models imply. 
A majority of the financial managers (82%) agree in 
the view that dividends decrease the risk of the stock 
for shareholders (S14). This is an implication of what 
the classical bird-in-the-hand approach suggests. 60% 
of European respondents think that dividends make a 
firm's stock less risky for shareholders. The opinions 
of the managers from the Turkish listed firms provide 
relatively stronger evidence to the bird-in-the-hand 
approach compared to the European managers. That 
result implies that the majority of Turkish managers 
think that dividend-paying firms attract risk-averse 
shareholders. 
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Table 4: Responses to the Statements Related to Dividend Decisions 
Column 1 lists each of the 18 statements rated by the respondents. Column 2 shows the percentage of responses of 
agree (+1) and strongly agree (+2). Column 3 shows the mean rating of each statement. Column 4 provides the result 
of the t-statistic for the null hypothesis that the mean response equals 0 (no importance). Columns 5 and 6 present the 
results from BBM (2005) survey, columns 7 and 8 present the results from BGHM (2005) survey. ***, ** and * 
denote a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
              Turkey Europe US 
Do these statements agree with your company’s 
dividend decisions? 
Agree 
or str. 
agree 
(%) 
n=38      
Mean 
H0: 
Avg. 
Ratin
g=0 
Agree 
or str. 
agree 
(%) 
n=93 
Mean 
Agree 
or str. 
agree 
(%) 
n=256      
Mean 
An optimal dividend policy strikes a balance between 
current dividends and future growth that maximizes 
stock price (S7) 
84.21 0.97 *** 78.26 0.97 n/a n/a 
Dividend changes will have an impact on executive 
compensation (S10) 
78.38 0.84 *** 1.09 -0.28 n/a n/a 
Dividend decisions convey information about our 
company to investors (S4) 
81.58 0.82 *** n/a n/a 80.00 1.00 
Dividends make a firm's stock less risky for 
shareholders (vs. retaining earnings) (S14) 
81.58 0.82 *** 60.22 0.56 37.50 0.00 
A firm should view cash dividends as a residual after 
financing desired investments from earnings (S9) 
75.68 0.81 *** 31.87 0.10 n/a n/a 
A firm's dividend policy generally affects its cost of 
capital (S8) 
70.27 0.78 *** 36.96 0.25 n/a n/a 
We make dividend decisions after our investment plans 
are determined (S1) 
73.68 0.68 *** 44.57 0.38 33.10 -0.30 
Dividends are as important now to the valuation of 
common stocks as they were 15 years ago (S3) 
65.79 0.61 *** 53.33 0.57 40.30 0.03 
A firm should set a target dividend payout ratio and 
adjust its current payout toward the target (S13) 
71.05 0.58 ** 54.35 0.48 n/a n/a 
We try to avoid reducing dividends per share (S2)  60.53 0.47 *** 82.80 1.22 93.80 1.57 
Investors prefer that a firm retains funds over paying 
dividends because of the way capital gains are taxed as 
compared with dividends (S15) 
57.89 0.45 *** 10.87 -0.17 n/a n/a 
Paying dividends is a priority (many financial 
decisions are secondary compared with dividends (S5) 
50.00 0.42 ** 44.09 0.25 n/a n/a 
Investors invest in firms whose dividend policies 
complement their particular tax circumstances (S16) 
47.37 0.26 
 
26.88 0.10 n/a n/a 
Dividend changes generally lag behind earnings 
changes (S6) 
44.74 0.08 
 
34.78 0.20 n/a n/a 
We pay dividends to show that our stock is valuable 
enough that investors buy it even though we have to 
pay relatively costly dividend taxes (S18) 
31.58 -0.11 
 
11.83 -0.16 16.60 -0.65 
Do these statements agree with your company’s 
dividend decisions? 
Agree 
or str. 
agree 
(%) 
n=38      
Mean 
H0: 
Avg. 
Ratin
g=0 
Agree 
or str. 
agree 
(%) 
n=93 
Mean 
Agree 
or str. 
agree 
(%) 
n=256      
Mean 
Investors generally prefer cash dividends today to 
uncertain future price appreciation (S17) 
23.68 -0.13 
 
53.76 0.49 n/a n/a 
We try to maintain a smooth dividend stream from 
year-to-year (S12) 
13.16 -0.95 *** 77.42 1.09 89.60 1.30 
We pay dividends to show that our firm is strong 
enough to pass up some profitable investments (S11) 
13.16 -0.95 *** 18.48 -0.05 9.00 -1.01 
Source: Author  
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76% of respondents agree that a firm should view cash 
dividends as a residual after financing desired 
investments from earnings (S9) with a mean rating of 
0.81. The survey result indicates that a majority of the 
financial managers of Turkish listed firms view the 
cash dividends as residual cash flows.  
74% of the respondents agree that they make dividend 
decisions after their investment plans are determined 
(S1). On a scale from -2 (strongly disagree) to +2 
(strongly agree), the mean rating is 0.68.  The result 
implies that investing decisions come before financing 
or dividend payout decisions. The responses to (S1) 
are consistent with the result of the statement (S9). 
This result supports the argument of residual cash 
flow. 45% of European respondents and 34% of the 
respondents from the US firms agree in that statement. 
Therefore, the survey results on Turkish listed firms 
provide evidence for free cash flow theory unlike the 
European and US firms. 
Trying to avoid reducing dividend per share (S2; mean 
rating: 0.47) is not a relatively common view for the 
respondents from Turkish listed firms whereas it is the 
most ranked statement for European and the US firms. 
61% of the respondents agree that they try to avoid 
reducing dividend per share while 94% of respondent 
firms from the US and 83% of European respondents 
agree in that statement. This result implies that a great 
majority of European and the US financial managers 
view dividend policy as a tool to manage DPS much 
more than Turkish managers. 
Only 13% of the respondents agree that they try to 
maintain a smooth dividend stream from year-to-year 
(S12; mean rating: -0.95). Dividend smoothing refers 
to distributing a fixed dividend amount over time. A 
significant majority of both European and the US 
managers (77% of European respondents and 90% of 
the US respondents) agree in that statement unlike 
Turkish managers. This is one of the important 
findings in the survey. Lintner (1956) suggests that 
firms smooth dividends over years. The empirical 
surveys conducted more than half a century ago and 
recent studies in Europe and the US still provide 
strong evidence for dividend smoothing. Nevertheless 
the responses from Turkish listed firms do not provide 
any evidence for dividend smoothing.  
Dividend targeting refers to a specific proportion of a 
firm’s earnings that firms would like to pay in 
dividends. Figure 1 exhibits the responses to what the 
firms target when they make dividend decisions. 51% 
of respondents report that they use dividend yield as 
dividend targeting. 19% of the respondents target 
payout ratio whereas 16% do not target at all. The 
results are very different when the responses from 
Turkish listed firms are compared to European and the 
US counterparts. DPS level (35%) is reported as the 
target used at most in dividend decision of 
respondents from European firms whereas 8% of 
respondents from Turkish listed firms report they use 
DPS level. Other than DPS level, European 
respondents use different dividend targets, such as 
growth in dividends per share (23%), and dividend 
yield (11%). The results of the respondents from the 
US are similar to European counterparts, but much 
different from the results of Turkish listed firms. 
 
Figure 1: Responses to the Question: What do you target when you make dividend decisions? 
The main hypothesis is that the opinions of the 
managers of Turkish listed firms on dividend policy 
are similar to European peers. Nonparametric 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to test whether there 
are differences between the opinions of Turkish listed 
firms' managers and European peers on dividend 
policy. The tests are performed on the mean ratings of 
the responses to the factors influencing dividends to 
test the hypothesis Hଵୟ		and on the mean ratings of 
agreement level in the statements related to dividend 
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policy to test the hypothesis Hଵୠ		separately. The test 
results provide mixed evidence. The values of test 
statistics of the mean ratings of the factors influencing 
dividend payout decisions are significant at the 5% 
level whereas those of the statements related to 
dividend decisions are not significant at the 5% level. 
Therefore, the hypothesis Hଵୟ is rejected whereas the 
hypothesis Hଵୠ is accepted. That means that the 
factors influencing the dividend decisions of the 
Turkish and European firms are not similar based on 
the opinions of their financial managers when their 
opinions on the statements related to dividend 
decisions are similar. Thus, there is not sufficient 
evidence to accept the similarity of Turkish and 
European firms’ dividend policies. 
Share Repurchases 
Share repurchase is a fresh issue for Turkish firms 
because acquiring a company’s own stocks has been 
legally permitted recently. The respondents were 
asked their opinions about share repurchase at the 
commencement of the new practice. The responses 
exhibit that the majority of managers are not much 
interested in share repurchases. Nevertheless if their 
firms were to repurchase the shares, the responses 
show that the most important factor would be the 
market price of the firm’s stock.  
Table 5 shows the responses to the factors that affect 
share repurchase decisions. 68% of the respondents 
report that market price of firm’s share is important in 
repurchase decision with a mean rating of 0.84 on a 
scale from (-2) to (+2). The second ranked factor in 
repurchase decision is merger and acquisition strategy. 
57% of the managers from respondent firms think that 
merger and acquisition strategy (F3) and having extra 
cash assets relative to the desired cash holdings (F6) 
are an important factor influencing share repurchases 
decision. The mean ratings are 0.41 and 0.38, 
respectively. Sustainable change in earnings is the 
next factor with a mean rating of 0.35. 51% of 
respondents think that sustainable change in earnings 
is an important factor in share repurchases decision. 
The most ranked factor influencing repurchase 
decision in both BBM (2005) and BGHM (2005) 
surveys is the market price of the stock like it is the 
case in our survey. The mean ratings of the 
respondents from European and the US firms are 
much higher than the mean rating of Turkish 
respondents; 1.38 and 1.30, respectively. The second 
ranked factor in repurchase decision is the availability 
of investment opportunities (F2) with mean ratings of 
1.14 and 1.10 for European and the US managers, 
respectively. On the contrary, the mean rating for the 
factor (F2) is -0.51 in our survey. The result implies 
that the availability of investment opportunities is not 
an important factor for share repurchases decision of 
Turkish firms unlike European and the US peers. In 
European and the US rankings, the next important 
factors are merger and acquisition strategy, and having 
excess cash assets relative to the desired cash 
holdings. These results are relatively similar to 
Turkish respondents. Nevertheless the mean ratings of 
European and the US firms are apparently much 
higher than Turkish firms. This shows that most 
Turkish managers do not find important to repurchase 
the firm’s own shares, yet. 
A nonparametric test is used to test the hypothesis 
Hଶ	about share repurchase decision. The equality of 
the paired relative rankings of all factors across the 
two groups is tested by Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
The results of test statistics are significant at the 5% 
level. Therefore, the hypothesis is rejected. According 
to test results, there is sufficient evidence to suggest 
that there are differences between the opinions of the 
managers from Turkish listed firms and European 
peers on the factors influencing share repurchase 
decision. 
Figure 2 exhibits a comparison of the factors 
influencing share repurchases and dividend payouts. 
The perceptions of managers on the factors of share 
repurchases versus dividend payouts give very 
different results. The ratings show that financial 
managers do not view repurchases as substitutes for 
dividends because the motives on share repurchases 
and dividend decisions are different. However having 
extra liquid assets relative to desired cash holdings has 
an importance on dividend payout and repurchase 
decisions nearly at the same extent. About half of the 
respondents agree that having excess liquid assets 
more than desired is an important factor both on share 
repurchases and dividend payouts. 35% of respondents 
agree that repurchases reduce cash and reducing cash 
disciplines the firm to make efficient decisions 
whereas 24% agree that paying out dividends reduces 
cash, and disciplines the firm to make efficient 
decisions. These results suggest that a firm with 
excess cash holdings is more likely to repurchase than 
paying out dividends. 
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Table 5: Responses to the Factors Influencing Share Repurchase Decisions 
Column 1 lists each of the 15 factors rated by the respondents. Column 2 shows the percentage of responses of important (+1) and very important (+2). Column 3 shows the 
mean rating of each factor. Column 4 provides the result of the t-statistic for the null hypothesis that the mean response equals 0 (no importance). Columns 5 and 6 present the 
results from BBM (2005), columns 7 and 8 present the results from BGHM (2005). ***, ** and * denote a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Turkey  Europe US 
How important would be the following factors if your company were to repurchase shares? 
Imp. or 
Very 
Imp. 
(%) 
n=38      
Mean 
H0: 
Average 
Rating=0 
Imp. 
or 
Very 
Imp.   
(%) 
n=93     
Mean 
Imp. or 
Very 
Imp.  
(%) 
n=256     
Mean 
Market price of our stock (if our stock is a good investment relative to its true value) (F1) 67.57 0.84 *** 90.11 1.38 86.40 1.30 
Merger and acquisition strategy (external stocks for growth transactions) (F3) 56.76 0.41 ** 64.44 0.80 72.30 0.90 
Having extra cash/liquid assets relative to our desired cash holdings (F6)  56.76 0.38 ** 64.04 0.75 61.90 0.70 
A sustainable change in earnings (F5) 51.35 0.35 ** 46.67 0.39 65.20 0.70 
Stability of future earnings (F4) 45.95 0.32 ** 50.56 0.46 65.60 0.70 
Offsetting the dilutionary effect of stock option plans or other stock programs (F10) 36.11 0.11 * 29.21 0.19 67.10 0.80 
The company wants to cancel share (F15) 43.24 0.11 
 
20.00 -0.02 n/a n/a 
Repurchasing shares to reduce cash, thereby disciplining our firm to make efficient decisions (F8) 35.14 0.03 
 
27.78 0.08 20.30 -0.60 
Increasing earnings per share (F9) 19.44 -0.42 ** 51.69 0.57 75.00 0.90 
The influence of our institutional shareholders (F7) 21.62 -0.46 ** 30.00 0.08 51.90 0.40 
The availability of good investment opportunities for our firm to pursue (F2) 21.62 -0.51 *** 77.78 1.14 80.30 1.10 
A temporary change in earnings (F12) 11.11 -0.67 *** 12.22 -0.18 35.00 -0.10 
To reinforce the control of major shareholders (F11) 5.56 -0.83 *** 8.89 -0.13 n/a n/a 
Personal taxes of our stockholders (F14) 5.56 -1.08 *** 14.44 -0.10 29.10 -0.30 
Repurchase shares is a better alternative than dividends to give cash to investors (F13) 2.78 -1.31 *** 18.89 0.09 n/a n/a 
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Figure 2: The Most Important Factors for Repurchases versus Dividend Payouts  
Note: The figure shows the percentages of respondents who agree in that the related factor is important or very important in dividend payouts / share repurchase 
decisions. 
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68% of the respondents agree that the market price of 
the firm’s share is an important factor in repurchase 
decision whereas 29% of the respondents view the 
market price of the firm’s share is an important factor 
in dividend payout decision. Ceteris paribus, a firm 
experiencing undervaluation of its share price is more 
likely to decide share repurchase than dividend 
payout. Additionally, institutional investors are 
influential more on dividend payouts rather than 
repurchases. 
Figure 3 shows the responses to the share repurchase 
definition. 38% of the respondents think share 
repurchase is a tool for financial flexibility. 22% of 
the respondents report that firms may repurchase 
shares for the purpose of managing EPS ratio. 16% of 
the managers have no idea while 16% of the managers 
state other opinions in the open-ended choice. Other 
opinions are generally affecting or manipulating 
market price of the stock. Only 8% of the respondents 
think share repurchase is an alternative to paying 
dividends.  
40% of European respondents think share repurchase 
is a tool for flexibility. This is a very similar result to 
Turkish respondents. Nevertheless 29% of European 
respondents think that share repurchase is an 
alternative to dividend payouts whereas it is a very 
poor alternative to dividend payouts in the opinions of 
the managers of Turkish listed firms. 
 
Figure 3: Responses to the Question: In your opinion, share repurchase is … 
Figure 4 shows the responses to the question whether 
the financial managers think Turkish firms will 
repurchase shares. 32% of the respondents think they 
may repurchase company’s shares. The most common 
response was “probably no” (37%). 21% of the 
managers are undecided about share repurchases. 5% 
of the respondents report they will definitely 
repurchase shares. The ratio of the ones who think 
they will definitely not repurchase shares is 5% in the 
meantime. In a different approach, 42% of the 
respondents report that they think their firms will not 
repurchase shares while 37% of the respondents think 
that they will.  
 
Figure 4: The Responses to the Question: Do you think your company will repurchase shares? 
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Cross-Sectional Regression Results 
The cross-sectional analysis shows differences 
between managers’ responses, based on the firm’s 
characteristics such as size, industry and others. It is 
investigated whether firm specific factors affect the 
opinions of managers on dividend policy, by running a 
cross-sectional logit regression model. Several firm 
characteristic variables are used to proxy these effects 
on dividend policy.  For the response rank of each 
factor and each statement in the survey, following 
cross-sectional regression model is established.  
[Response	Rank]୧	ୀ	α +	βଵ	[Size] +	βଶ[Industry]
+ βଷ	[ForeignSales]
+ βସ	[ForeignShares]
+	βହ	[FloatingRate]
+	β଺	[Ownership]
+ β଻	[PayoutRatio]
+	β଼	[Leverage] +	βଽ	[P/B]
+ +	βଵ଴	[P/E] +	βଵଵ	[EPS] +		ϵ୧	; 
where [Response Rank] j is the rating of respondent 
firm i, and varies between (-2) to (+2) which 
represents not important to very important. We try to 
estimate the relative importance of factors and the 
opinions of financial managers based on firm specific 
variables. Firm size (Size) is measured by the natural 
log of the sales revenue. Industry (Ind) is denoted as 
manufacturing or not, and ownership (Own) is 
designated by family control in the analysis. Foreign 
sales (Exp) indicate the proportion of foreign sales to 
the total sales revenue of a respondent firm. Foreign 
shares (For) variable is the ratio of shares of a firm 
held by foreigners. Leverage is (DA) measured by the 
ratio of debts to total assets. 
Ramsey’s RESET is performed to test some probable 
problems including omitted variables and 
misspecification errors, and provide robustness to the 
model. The results show that the regression models do 
not include misspecification errors. 
The Relationships between the Firm 
Characteristics and the Dividend Payouts 
The cross-sectional tests are used to determine the 
level of significance of the differences in the level of 
agreement according to the characteristics of 
respondent firms. The results indicate that firm 
specific variables have little significance on the factors 
of dividend decision while some are insignificant on 
the variation in the rankings of dividend policy 
factors. No firm characteristic is significant in the 
variation of the rankings of 6 of 16 factors (Table 3; 
F6, F7, F9, F13, F15 and F16).  
Size is the most common firm specific determinant in 
the variation of responses. the responses of the 
managers of small / large firms differ significantly on 
5 of 16 factors (F1, F2, F3, F8 and F12). Larger firms 
are less likely to agree on the effect of sustainable 
change in earnings, and stability and level of future 
earnings on dividend decisions. Foreign ownership is 
significant on the variation in the rankings of 4 of 16 
factors (F3, F8, F12 and F14). The managers of the 
firms with more foreign ownership are more likely to 
agree on the importance of F3.  
Smoothing dividends: Ownership and size are 
significant in the variation in the rankings of the S12 
which is “we try to maintain a smooth dividend stream 
from year-to-year.” Family controlled firms care more 
about smoothing dividends whereas larger firms care 
less about smoothing dividends. These variables 
explain about 28 percent of the cross-sectional 
variation in the ranking. 
Targeting payout ratio: Payout ratio, family control, 
foreign shares, size and price-to-book ratio are 
significant in the variation in the rankings in the 
agreement level of informational content of dividends.  
Payout ratio is significant at the 1% level and 
negatively related to the variation in the rankings of 
target payout ratio. That means firms with higher 
payout ratios care less about targeting dividends. 
Family control and price-to-book ratio are positively 
related to targeting. Foreign shares are negatively 
related to targeting policy. The results suggest that 
family controlled and/or high market value firms care 
more about dividend targeting whereas firms with 
higher foreign ownership and/or higher payout ratios 
care less about dividend targeting. These variables 
explain about 67 percent of the cross-sectional 
variation in the ranking. 
Informational content of dividends: The cross-
sectional analysis indicates that firm specific factors; 
industry, payout ratio, size and price-to-book ratio are 
significant in the variation in the rankings in the 
agreement level of informational content of dividends.  
These variables explain about 68 percent of the cross-
sectional variation in the ranking. The managers from 
manufacturing firms and/or the firms with higher 
payout ratios are more likely to report they believe in 
the informational content of dividends.  
Agency costs and self-imposed discipline by payout 
policy: Foreign ownership and foreign sales are 
related to the variation in the ranking of this factor. 
Accordingly, firms with higher foreign sales in 
relative to their total sales are more likely to think that 
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paying dividends reduces cash and disciplines their 
firms to make efficient decisions. Foreign ownership 
is negatively related to this factor. The managers from 
the firms with more foreign ownership are less likely 
to agree in this factor.  
The Relationships between the Firm 
Characteristics and the Factors Influencing Share 
Repurchase Decisions 
The variations in firm characteristics have limited 
significance in the variations of rankings in share 
repurchase determinants. No firm characteristic differs 
significantly in 5 of 15 share repurchase factors (Table 
5; F4, F5, F9, F12 and F14). This result suggests that 
the variations in firm characteristics such as size, 
industry, profitability, leverage and others have little 
effect on the factors of share repurchase decision. 
However the most significant variable among the 
firm-specific variables explaining the ranking of share 
repurchase determinants is the payout ratio of the 
respondent firms. 
Market price of the stock (F1) is the most important 
factor which affects share repurchase decision 
according to the survey results. The cross-sectional 
analysis indicates that the firms with higher payout 
ratios and/or lower P/E ratios are more likely to agree 
on that market price of the stock is important on share 
repurchase decision. These two firm specific factors 
explain about 50 percent of the cross-sectional 
variation in the ranking of the stock price factor in 
share repurchases.  
The cross-sectional results presented here should be 
interpreted with some caution because of potential 
biases and measurement problems that are inherent in 
survey researches. The survey has a relatively narrow 
sample size and limited number of respondents despite 
an acceptable response rate. That weakens the 
statistical power of the test results. 
Conclusion  
The corporate dividend payout policy of Turkish listed 
firms is investigated in this research. The study uses 
survey methodology to examine the opinions of 
corporate managers on the dividend policy of their 
firms.  The opinions of financial managers are crucial 
on dividends because they take important roles in 
corporate financing decisions.  
The survey results show that majority of Lintner’s 
findings (1956) obtained more than half a century ago 
are valid at BIST today whereas some are not 
supported. Earnings level and the stability of future 
earnings are the most important factors influencing 
dividend decisions as Lintner suggested. Majority of 
financial managers report that they try to maintain the 
consistency with the historical level of dividends. This 
result is consistent with Lintner.  Nevertheless, they 
do not agree in smoothing dividends as Lintner 
proposed.   
The main hypothesis of the survey is the views of 
Turkish and European firms’ managers on dividend 
payout policy are influenced by similar factors. 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to test whether there 
are differences between the opinions of two groups. 
The opinions of the European managers are based on 
the findings of the survey study of Bancel et al. 
(2005). The test results provide mixed evidence. The 
test results suggest that the opinions of the Turkish 
firms’ managers and European peers on the factors 
influencing the dividend decisions are not similar 
when their opinions on the statements related to 
dividend decisions are similar. Thus, there is not 
sufficient evidence to accept the hypothesis. 
Share repurchase is a fresh issue in Turkish share 
market. The survey research results presented in this 
study shed light on that under which specific 
conditions Turkish listed firms are more likely to 
decide share repurchase or dividend payouts. Market 
price of a firm’s share is the most important factor in 
share repurchase decision as it is such like in the 
survey results of Brav et al. (2005) and Bancel et al. 
(2005) for US firms and European firms. This study is 
one of the first empirical studies on share repurchase 
decision of Turkish listed firms. 
The research contributes to the dividend literature by 
examining the evidence on Turkish listed firms’ 
dividend behaviours on BIST which is an 
internationalized emerging stock market. The 
determinants of dividend decisions and the rationale 
behind the dividend policy are investigated through a 
survey on the opinions of finance executives. The 
results provide valuable evidence for the 
understanding of corporate dividend behaviours of 
Turkish firms. 
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